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"THE LATE UNFORTUNATE
REGICIDE IN FRANCE"
Burke and the Political Sublime
Charles Hinnant

just as the place of the Philosophical Enquiry into the
I Origin of our Ideas of the Sublime and the Beautiful (1757)
the canon of Edmund Burke's writings remains
uncertain, so the place of the sublime within the more restricted
scope of the Enquiry remains equally problematic. The fact
that the very first example of the sublime that Burke cites in
the second edition of 1759 is the death two years earlier of
Robert Damiens, "the late unfortunate regicide in France,"' is
indicative of the difficulty. Arthur Murphy, in his review of
the first edition, had written of Burke's central contention that
the ideas of pain and terror are the ultimate sources of the
sublime: "but surely this is false philosophy: the brodequin of
Ravilliac, and the iron bed of Damien are capable of exciting
' A Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of our Ideas of the Sublime and the
Beautiful, ed. and intro. James T. Boulton (New York: Columbia University Press,
1958), 39. Hereafter cited in parentheses as "E."
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alarming ideas of terror, but cannot be said to hold anything of
the sublime" (E, 39n). By incorporating Damiens into the
second edition, Burke makes the concept fully coherent with
the interrelated orders of terror and astonishment. The
spectacle of Damiens's suffering, too, becomes a part of that
diptych structure.
The point of Murphy's criticism is not hard to understand,
for the gruesome scene of Damiens's torture could hardly be
more different from conventional instances of the eight
eenth-century natural sublime: mountains, oceans, volcanos,
wild beasts, and stormy nights. Yet this scene may not be
without its own appeal, for the flayed, crucified, and disembow
elled body has become a veritable emblem of a certain approach
(call it New Historicism) in recent criticism. Indeed, it is
noteworthy that Michel Foucault begins Discipline and Punish:
The Birth of the Prison with a now famous account of Damiens's
punishment. Drawing upon legal documents of the procedure
and the Gazette d'Amsterdam issued on 1 April, 1757, Foucault
describes the would-be French assassin undergoing mutilation,
torments of hot lead, melted wax and sulphur poured into
wounds torn into his chest, thighs, and buttocks by pincers,
ineffective quartering followed by dismemberment, and the
burning of his trunk and body parts.^ Although Burke does
not depict Damiens's execution in the same explicit detail, he
undoubtedly assumed that his readers were acquainted with
contemporary accounts. In a "Narrative of the Trial" published
in the Monthly Review, we find the following graphic account
of the initial stage of the execution:
Towards five o'clock he was placed on the scaffold which
had been erected in the middle of the enclosed area, and
was raised about three feet and an half from the ground;
the length from eight to nine feet, and of about the same
^ Michel FoucavJt, Discipline and Punish, tians. Alan Sheridan (New York: Random
House, 1979), 3-6. Hereafter cited in parentheses as "D&P."
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breadth. The criminal was instantly tied, and afterwards
fastened by iron gyves, which confined him under the
arms, and above the thighs. The first torment he
underwent, was that of having his hand burnt in the
flame of brimstone: the pain of which made him send
forth such a terrible cry as might be heard a great way
off. A moment afterwards he raised his head, and looked
for sometime earnestly at his hand, without renewing the
cries, and without expressing any passion, or breaking out
into any imprecation. To this first torment succeeded
that of pinching him with red-hot pincers, in the arms,
thighs, and breasts. At each pinch he was heard to shriek
in the same manner, as when his hand was burnt. He
looked and gazed at each wound, and his cries ceased as
soon as the pinching was over. They afterwards poured
boiling oil, and melted lead and rosin, into every wound,
except those of the breast, which produced, in all those
circumstances, the same effect as the first two tortures.'
Burke's editor, Jarries T. Boulton, lists an additional periodi
cal—Tiferajy Magazine, 11, 1-4—that also devoted extensive
attention to the incident (E, 39n); and the Monthly Review also
referred to two lives of the regicide but was unwilling to review
either, on the ground that "we have seen enough of Damiens
already in the newspapers.'"*
Foucault's argument differs profoundly from Burke's, of
course, but the fact that they begin with the same example
suggests that Burke's ideas might be profitably compared with
' Monthly Review 17 (1757): 76. For a useful account of the spectacle of public
executions in England, see Lincoln B. Faller, Turned to Account: The Forms and
Functions cf Criminal Biography in Late Seventeenth- and Early Eighteenth-Century
England (Cambridge: Cambridge Univenity Press, 1987). Faller notes that while
"torture was rarely practiced in England...criminals lived their lives over" in
journalistic and semi-fictional accounts (x^.
* Monthly Review, 1757; qtd. from Herbert A. Wilchelns, "Burke's Essay on the
Sublime and its Reviewen," /EGP 21 (1922): 651.
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those of the French historian. By relating the sublime to the
"spectacle" of punishment, Burke highlights an issue that is also
prominent in Foucault's ailment—the material relation of
power to the body of the subject. In this respect, Burke's
sublime differs from the sublime moment as we ordinarily tend
to think of it in eighteenth-century criticism, where sublimity
is more intimately linked with nature and especially with the
wilder aspects of outdoor scenes. Burke might choose to
include some examples that contemporary reviewers would
understand; what he also formulates could be more precisely
characterized as a "political" rather than a natural sublime. It
remains to inquire what are the implications of this political
sublime for a fuller understanding of Burke's writings. In
addressing this question, I shall make occasional use, when it
seems appropriate, of Foucault's discussion of power in
Discipline and Punish and The History of Sexuality, Volume One:
An Introduction. Foucault's understanding of power has not
gone unchallenged, but it affords some illuminating parallels
with Burke's thought.'

Burke's proximity to Foucault does not end with the example
of Damiens. In The History of Sexuality, Volume One, Foucault
opposed what he termed an "analytics of power" to "theory,"
and by theory he probably meant what Burke had in mind
when he attacked the "grand theories" of the "speculatists" in
Reflections on the Revolution in France.'' For both Burke and
Foucault, such theories are the product of misguided intentions,
' See Sheldon S. Wolin, "On the Theory and Practice of Power," in After Foucault;
Humanistic Knowledge, Postmodern Challenges, ed. Jonathan Arac (New Brunswick;
Rutgers University Press, 1988), 179-201.
' History of Sexuality, An Introduction, vol. 1, trans. Robert Hurley (1975; New
York, Vintage Books, 1990), 82. Hereafter cited in parentheses as "HSl."
Reflections on the Revolution in France, ed. J. G. A. Pocock (Indianapolis: Hackett,
1987), 51, 79. Hereafter cited in parentheses as "R."
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a product whose penchant for a priori reasoning obscures more
than it reveals. The most important among the grand theories
for Foucault are liberalism and Marxism, though he may also
be thinking of the Hegelian master-slave dialectic, since he refers
in one interview to "the insubstantiality of the notion of the
master, an empty form haunted only by the various phantoms
of the master and slave."^ An examination, in the light of
Foucault, of Burke's "analytics of power" will disclose Burke's
own awareness of "the insubstantiality of the notion of master."
Burke, of course, never formulates a systematic theory of power
in the Hegelian sense, yet he provides enough hints in the
Enquiry so that one could, if one wished, construct a compara
ble model of power relations from his argument.
Burke distinguishes between the passions relating to self
preservation—for example, the passions which "turn on pain
and danger"—znd three passions belonging to society:
sympathy, imitation, and ambition. Sympathy is "a sort of
substitution, by which we are put into the place of another
man, and affected in many respects as he is affected" (E, 44),
while imitation is "an affection" that "prompts us to copy
whatever [others] do" (E, 49). Although imitation "is one of
the great instruments used by providence in bringing our nature
toward its perfection," it is a passion that is essentially static:
"if men gave themselves up to imitation entirely, and each
followed the other, and so on in an eternal circle, it is easy to
see that there never could be any improvement amongst them."
To raise men above the level of "brutes," "God has planted in
man a sense of ambition, and a satisfaction arising from the
contemplation of his excelling his fellows in something deemed
valuable amongst them" (E, 50). Ambition thus involves the
introduction of competition and strife into a genteel world of
sociality and imitation; it is what destabilizes the system.
' Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, ed. Colin Gordon
(New York: Pantheon, 1972), 139. Hereafter cited in parentheses as "P/K."
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breaching "the eternal circle" of nature, opening it up to the
play of cultural "improvement" and history.
It is just here that we might expect to find something
comparable to the Hegelian dialectic of master and slave. Yet
it is also here that Burke appears to diflFer most strikingly from
the Hegelian pattern. In the Hegelian struggle for recognition,
there is a shattering contest of wills in which one subject
concedes victory to another, sacrificing his freedom in order to
survive. Instead of being killed by his opponent, he submits
and his life is spared; the master, by contrast, risks his life in
order to win recognition, to experience the pleasure of victory.
In Burke's Enquiry, there appears to be nothing comparable to
this struggle for recognition; everyone, including the master, is
a slave, as it were, and the slave who becomes a master remains
a slave. Burke holds that "we love what submits to us" (E,
113), but he does not see this love as leading to a titanic conflict
of wills. For Burke, the equivalent of the Hegelian anxiety
toward death is the "apprehension of pain or death" (E, S7).
Since all living beings experience this apprehension, they never
enter into a dialectical struggle for autonomy. Ambition, as
one of the three social passions, is what engenders cultural and
political inequality, yet ambition is not sufficiently strong to
counter the passions of self-preservation, "which turn mostly on
pain or danger^ (E, 38). In place of the Hegelian recognition
scene, a scene in which the master is recognized by the slave.
Burke supplies us with another kind of scene—one in which we
stay alive, maintain ourselves in life, and show respect for death
at the very moment in which we become aware of the dangers
confronting us. When we discover that we have escaped from
these dangers, our anxiety is transformed into "delight," a
passion that is uniquely appropriate to our experience of the
sublime: "Whatever excites this delight I call sublime," Burke
writes; "the passions belonging to self-preservation are the
strongest of all the passions" (E, 51).'
' Frances Ferguson observes that whfle the Burkean sublime "depends on primitive
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Burke takes great care to distinguish "delight" from the
closely related but nonetheless distinct passion of "pleasure,"
which he associates exclusively with beauty, love, and society.
As Suzanne Guerlac has noted, the "slippage from positive pain
to delight" in Burke "is thoroughly ambiguous, since pain is
posited and cancelled."' It is perhaps more accurate to say that
pain is posited, then cancelled and preserved. Burke makes this
explicit when he describes our "escaping from some imminent
danger" as "a sort of tranquillity shadowed with horror" (E, 34).
Needless to say, there is no place in this system for any
recognition by the other: Burke sees ambition as a kind of
self-satisfaction; fear, a kind of self-concern. Thus, when the
master is confronted by danger, he will react in exactly the
same way as the slave. In this respect. Burke bears some resem
blance to Foucault, who is emphatic in his insistence that the
dominating are subject to the same network of power relations
as the dominated.^® In both Burke and Foucault, this capacity
for subjection implies that biological existence is a docile
existence, prepared in advance for its position in a society in
which it mainly submits to its own finitude. Burke's account
feelings of dread," the sublime "delight only arises when danger and pain do not
'press too nearly'" ("The Sublime of Edmund Burke, or the Bathos of Experience,"
Glyph 8 [1981]: 40; and Solitude and the Sublime: Romanticism and the Aesthetics
of Individuation [London: Routledge, 1992], 46).
' Suzanne Guerlac, The Impersonal Sublime: Hugo, Baudelaire, Lautremont
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990), 6.
One could aigue that Thomas Weiskel describes this servile condition in
psychoanalytic terms, holding that Burke's delight is "the affective correlative of
a positive 'identification' with the Father, an identification which both presupposes
the rentmciation of parricidal aggression and facilitates an escape from the imagined
consequences of a murder." See The Romantic Sublime: Studies in the Structure of
Transcending (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univenity Press, 1976), 91. Peter de
Bolla, concerned with the constitution of subjectivity, finds a "retreat" in Burke
"from what he recognizes as the potential...for the excess of a self-authenticating
subjectivity," and a corresponding sense that "the mind is both absorbed and
overwhelmed by the subject of the sublime so that it is in danger of losing its own
independence, its own sense of self" IJhe Discourse of the Sublime: Readings in
History, Aesthetic and the Sul^ect [Oxford: Blackwell, 1989], 70).

118

1650-1850

/ /, '. /'< /' / ,/ • /, . ,•>/!- \'/;

AJXO

IS (•/•:,/>// //// o "'/>/, /fUf.'^f///7.; •.

Figure 1: "Robert Francis Damiens," from the Literary Magazine, 1757.
Courtesy The Newberry Library, Chicago.
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of the twofold sources of the sublime—one familiar, the other
invariably overlooked—is consistent with this servile condition.
"Burke's delight," as Thomas Weiskel observes, "requires
wonder...as the positive expression of feeling on release from
terror";" but it also possesses a less generally noticed, more
sinister side—a contemplation (from a safe distance) of the
suffering of others: "I am convinced we have a degree of
delight, and that no small one, in the real misfortunes and pains
of others" (E, 45). We shall never understand the political
implications of Burke's sublime—a sublime that includes
spectacles of torture and suffering—unless we realize that it also
embodies this second "degree of delight." There is nothing
comparable, so far as I can determine, in Foucault, for whom
pain is not subject to the same kind of speculation as pleasure,
though one could at^ue that Burke's "delight" corresponds to
what Foucault characterizes as "pleasure in the truth of
pleasure, the pleasure of knowing that truth, of discovering and
exposing it, the fascination of seeing and telling it" (HSl, 71).
Burke finds no corresponding secondary pleasure—unless it is
"grief," a passion in which "the pleasure is still uppermost" (E,
37)—but his delight, it seems apparent, is a pleasure in the truth
of pain, the pleasure of knowing that truth, the fascination of
seeing and telling it. For Burke, this "delight," which occurs
from the "removal of pain and danger," is similarly intense:
"there is no spectacle that we so eagerly pursue, as that of some
uncommon and grievous calamity; so that whether the
misfortune is before our eyes, or whether they are turned back
to it in history, it always touches with delight" (E, 46).
When we understand Burke's delight as a correlative of
Foucault's voyeuristic pleasure in the pleasure of sexuality, we
can better account for the immense, even hypnotic appeal that
Burke attributes to public executions. Delight establishes a
distance between spectators and the scaffold, and the notion of
a "spectacle" implicitly or explicitly invokes a frame to separate
The Romantic Sublime, 90.
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spectators from a sense of personal danger. If we accept the
premises of Burke's reasoning, this delight is precisely what
Foucault's own description would stimulate us to experience.
In Discipline and Punish, the torture and execution of Damiens
constitutes both the object of analysis and the illustration of the
argument; the material is implicitly visual and even though it
relies on published accounts, the nature of the discourse quoted
is visually descriptive. Although Foucault may have intended
his illustration to appeal to our sense of outrage, its effect may
be thoroughly ambiguous. Burke's delight is not "unmixed,"
moreover, for it is "blended with no small uneasiness" (E, 46).
This amalgam occurs because "the delight we have in such
things hinders us from shunning scenes of misery; and the pain
we feel, prompts us to relieve ourselves in relieving those who
suffer" (E, 46). "We would thus seem to experience two
different kinds of responses simultaneously, once the danger has
been removed: a primary delight that draws us to the spectacle
of pain, and a derived sympathy that depends upon our
imaginative identification with the victim.'^ The coexistence of
these two conflicting responses could provide one sort of
explanation for the aura of ambivalence and uncertainty that
surrounded the public execution. As Foucault notes, the formal
efficacy of the execution was often a matter of doubt, and local
circumstances could easily transform it into a celebration of the
condemned victim's role as a defler of repressive authority:
the public execution allowed the luxury of these
momentary saturnalia, when nothing remained to
Stephen Greenblatt argues that delight in the theater was also accompanied by
anxiety: "the whole point of anxiety in the theater is to make it give such delight
that the audience wiU pay for it again and again. And this delight seems bound up
with the marking out of theatrical anxiety as represented anxiety—not whoUy real,
either in the characters onstage or in the audience." See "Martial Law in the Land
of Cockaigne," in Shakespearean Negotiations (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1988), 135. The "uneasiness" that Burke identifies as part of our response
to public spectacles is similarly theatrical, not wholly real like actual danger, nor
wholly fictitious like an obviously pretended concern.
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prohibit or punish. Under the protection of imminent
death, the criminal could say everything and the crowd
cheered...In these executions, which ought to show only
the terrorizing power of the prince, there was the whole
aspect of the carnival, in which the rules were inverted,
authority mocked and criminals transformed into heroes.
p&P, 60-61)
Burke would aigue that power's condition of possibility, or in
any case the viewpoint that permits us to understand its
exercise, must be sought in the passions; it is in the moving
substrate of relations between fear, sympathy, and delight that
we can establish the basis for an account of the uncertain
relation between power and resistance, or, in the further
elaboration developed by New Historicists, among the elements
of any triadic formula involving consolidation, subversion, and
containment."
Burke's theory is based on a foundation of common belief
and affective predisposition, so that the appeal of the public
spectacle is held to be well nigh universal. Upon "reflection,"
a scene such as the destruction of a major city by fire or natural
disaster might appear abhorrent, but because of the power of
the spectacle it exerts an appeal that can challenge ordinarymoral judgments:
We delight in seeing things, which so far from doing, our
heartiest wishes would be to see redressed. This noble
capital, the pride of England and of Europe, I believe no
man is so strangely wicked as to desire to see destroyed
by a conflagration or an earthquake, though he should be
removed himself to the greatest distance from the danger.
" See Stephen Greenblatt, "Invisible Bullets: Renaissance Authority and its
Subversion," in Shakespearean Negotiations, 21-65; and Jonathan DoUimore,
"Intibduction" to Political Shakespeare: New Essays in Cultural Materialism, ed.
Jonathan Dollimore and Allan Sinfield (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1985),
10-14.
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But suppose such a fatal accident to have happened, what
numbers from all parts would croud [sic] to behold the
ruins, and amongst them many who would have been
content never to have seen London in its glory? (E, 47-8)
The spectacle, unfolding as a spectacle only from a distance,
from "the greatest distance from the danger," is of a conflagra
tion or earthquake occurring; or, better yet, that has already
occurred. The "greatest distance" is the condition for what
unfolds as a spectacle, distance being the aestheticizing or
anesthetizing of what is occurring. The sublime spectacle is no
longer a source of fear, nor can it be seen in terms of some
global relation of dominators to dominated. This is not to say
that it should be viewed as indistinguishable from theatrical
entertainment. Indeed, "the nearer it approaches the reality,
and the further it removes us from all idea of fiction, the more
perfect is its power" (E, 47). Tragedy pales in comparison with
this reality:
Chuse a day on which to represent the most sublime and
affecting tragedy we have; appoint the most favourite
actors; spare no cost upon the scenes and decorations;
unite the greatest efforts of poetry, painting and music;
and when you have collected your audience, just at the
moment when their minds are erect with expectation, let
it be reported that a state criminal of high rank is on the
point of being executed in the adjoining square; in a
moment the emptiness of the theatre would demonstrate
the comparative weakness of the imitative arts, and
proclaim the triumph of the real sympathy. (E, 47).
For a spectacle to exert its power over us, we must be in
some proximity to it; we must see it or hear it reported,
preferably from a place nearby. Yet this does not mean that it
results from individual human agency. It rather operates as a
mechanism of collective attraction. It can compel us. Burke
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holds, by "an instinct that works to its own purposes, without
our concurrence...and all this antecedent to any reasoning" (E,
46). Burke refers elsewhere in the Enquiry to "the contagion of
our passions," by which "we catch a fire already kindled in
another" (E, 175-6). This contagion might help us to
understand Foucault's enigmatic contention that "power
relations are both intentional and nonsubjective" (HSl, 94). In
terms of the ai^ument Burke develops to account for the power
of the sublime spectacle, these relations are intentional in the
sense that they are directed toward an object, and nonsubjective
in the sense that they are oriented by an "instinct" that operates
collectively, prior to any kind of self-conscious deliberation.
It is easy to recognize the extraordinary internal ambivalence
of a relation that could just as easily be aroused by a terroristic
act as by the execution of "a state criminal of high rank." The
mere statement of the possibilities suffices to show how Burke's
argument could be susceptible to a much more realistic
interpretation, one that grounded the domination of one group
or individual over another in a sado-fascist aesthetics of pleasure
in pain. Why is this so, if the only goal of domination is to rid
the oppressed of their oppressors.^ Burke spells out the answer
for us in the Reflections, where he contends at one point that
"the cruelty" of the Jacobins "has not even been the base result
of fear. It has been the effect of their sense of perfect safety"
(R, 35). Such formulations are a great deal less circumspect
than Burke's earlier idiom in the Enquiry. They evoke a mood
of bitter disillusionment even in the process of describing the
same mechanism of delight. This disillusionment is yet more
pronounced in a passage where Burke depicts the execution of
two of the king's gentleman immediately before the forcible
evacuation of the royal family to Paris:
Two had been selected from the unprovoked, unresisted,
promiscuous slaughter, which was made of the gentlemen
of noble birth and family who composed the king's body
guard. These two gentlemen, with all the parade of an
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execution of justice, were cruelly and publicly dragged to
the block and beheaded in the great court of the palace.
Their heads were stuck upon spears and led the proces
sion, whilst the royal captives who followed in the train
were slowly moved along, amidst the horrid yells, and
shrilling screams, and frantic dances, and infamous
contumelies, and all the unutterable abominations of the
furies of hell in the abused shape of the vilest of women.
(R, 63)
This account of the fickleness of public opinion and the
ever-present dangers of mob rule descends more by way of
Shakespeare than Longinus. It conveys a note of hysteria and
carnival that is hardly present in Burke's earlier treatise.
Certainly, it seems very remote from the tone of enlightened
tolerance that Burke adopts toward most of his examples in the
Enquiry. Yet it would be a mistake to assume that Burke had
abandoned the analysis of sublimity of the earlier work in favor
of a theory that specifically stresses historical and economic
issues. Indeed, the Enquiry has all too often been regarded as
occupying a distinct place in Burke's oeuvre or as appealing to
a different (and presumably more genteel, literary) audience
than his political writings. Yet it can just as easily be seen as an
anticipation—or even as a "grounding"—of the principles that
guide the Reflections.^^ From this perspective, the "egoism" and
" There are several important general discussions of the relations between the
Enquiry and Burke's writings on the French Revolution. James T. Boulton traces
the highly colored rhetoric of Burke's Reflections to his early preference for a
strong over a clear expression {Jhe Language of Politics in the Age of Wilkes and
Burke [London: Routledge, 1963], 130); Peter H. Melvin relates Burke's critique
of the false theatrics of the Jacobins to his early critique of the conventions of
neoclassical tragedy in the Enquiry ("Burke on Theatricahty and Revolution,"
Journal of the History of Ideas 36 [1975]: 447-68); and Christopher Reid holds that
Burke's rhetoric in the Reflections is shaped by the conventions of pathetic tragedy
and by the affective theories of the Enquiry ("Burke's Tragic Muse: Sarah Siddons
and the 'Feminization' of the Reflections," in Burke and the French Revolution:
Bicentennial Essays, ed. Steven Blakemore [Athens: University of Georgia Press,
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"emotionalism" that have troubled so many readers of the later
work can be seen as transposing into intensely subjective terms
the same passions—fear, delight, and sympathy—that Burke
described so carefully in the Enquiry. If the Jacobins are
described as servile, it is because they preserve within them
selves traces of these passions. For Burke, fully as much as for
Foucault, "power comes from below" (HSl, 94). In the
Reflections, Burke pushes this perception toward that moment
where this power is visibly inscribed in the horrifying return of
a repressed female agency—in the demonic "furies of hell"
unleashed by the French Revolution.
This is not to affirm that Burke was unaware of this possible
line of interpretation when he composed the Enquiry. In a
gesture that is absolutely typical of the earlier work. Burke
declares, as we have seen, that he believes "no man is so
strangely wicked as to desire to see [London] destroyed." When
we compare this with Burke's argument in the Reflections, we
cannot but be struck by the contrast.^' Its lack of conviction
from the standpoint of ordinary common sense, not to mention
post-Lockean empirical psychology, earns it a distinct place in
Burke's treatise. Throughout the Enquiry, power seems to be
incorporated into two distinct modes of discourse: a materialist
framework of bodily desires and fears and a genteel morality
conforming to quite different standards. There is no real
passage from one to the other: the role of the second with
respect to the first is to produce a not-always convincing cover.
1992], 1-27).
" Burke proposes a different understanding of the connection between theater and
real life in the Reflections. Instead of regarding tragedy as a pallid reflection of
reality, he now views the stage as the site of a "natural" response to spectacles of
pain, maintaining that a theatrical audience would respond compassionately to
what it might "exiJt" over in "real life" (R, 70-72). Sympathy and delight are now
parts of two distinct relations and hence are mutually independent. Tom Furniss,
in "Stripping the Queen: Edmund Burke's Magic Lantern Show," suggests that
there is a contradiaion between this conception of a natural emotion and Burke's
earlier conviction that words are arbitrary {Burke and the French Revolution, 88,
92).
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under which moral objections can be dealt with, can be
forestalled by recasting the argument in an ethico-religious
sounding vocabulary. Yet the cover is never complete and
indeed at times almost seems intended to draw attention to the
existence of another more realistic and candid discourse beneath
it.

Of course it might reasonably be objected at this point that
there is really no possibility of reading Burke in terms of
Foucault, since Foucault's project is a resolutely secular analysis
of the way power works "at the level of on-going subjugation,
at the level of those continuous and uninterrupted processes
which subject our bodies, govern our gestures, dictate our
behaviours" {P/K, 97), where Burke ultimately extends his
argument to include the existence of "a Godhead" seemingly
vouchsafed to the mind through a contemplation of "his
attributes and their operation" (E, 68). But this objection
clearly carries less weight once we recognize that Burke's
emphasis is also on the way power is involved in a process of
subjugation, even though this emphasis is cast in theological
terms and accompanied by a characteristically unconvincing
disclaimer: "before the Christian religion had, as it were,
humanized the idea of the divinity, and brought it somewhere
nearer to us, there was very little said of the love of God" (E,
70). Indeed, there is no suggestion of love in those passages
where the political experience of the sublime becomes the
vehicle for a regained proximity, a transition from otherness to
the other. One might argue that in these passages Burke seems
closer to Emmanuel Levinas than to Foucault, for the sublime,
rather than appearing as a spectacle of suffering, seems to be a
provisional stage toward a more exalted level of experience, a
level that may or may not necessarily be ethical but that points
well beyond the confines of poetry and philosophical analysis.
In this stage, distance collapses and delight is replaced by joy.
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but joy seems more unpredictable than delight, for neither the
spectacle of divine power, nor the "conviction of the justice
with which it is exercised, nor the mercy with which it is
tempered, can wholly remove the terror that naturally arises
from a force which nothing can withstand" (E, 68). We can see
Burke's distance from Foucault in the importance that Burke
attaches to this force. For Foucault, power "must not be
sought in the primary existence of a central point, in a unique
source of sovereignty from which secondary and derived forms
would emanate" (HSl, 93). For Burke, on the contrary, this
notion of power would leave no room for any account of how
religion works at a level of on-going subjugation, in which God
conceived in traditional 0udjeo-Christian) terms as an
omnipotent deity, acts to dispel any notion that human power
is irresistible and unopposable.
To a certain extent, this argument relies on another
assumption that Foucault would reject: that power is related to
"a certain strength" with which "we are endowed" (HSl, 93).
The power of men is unequal to the power of God; the power
of animals (and women) is unequal to the power of men. Thus
there is no primeval conflict between man and nature compara
ble to the encounter between man and the deity. It is true that
Burke asks rhetorically.
Look at man, or any other animal of prodigious strength,
and what is your idea before reflection.' Is it that this
strength will be subservient to you, to your ease, to your
pleasure, to your interest in any sense? No; the emotion
you feel is, lest this enormous strength be employed to
the purposes of rapine and destruction. (E, 65).
At first glance. Burke appears to be alluding here to a violent
animal power from which we recoil in horror. But this
overlooks the secondary moment of "reflection," a moment that
can provide a more precise estimate of the relative power of
different beings. This is perhaps one reason why Burke never
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refers to animals in terms of the conventional eight
eenth-century natural sublime, as part of what threatens our
attempts to become masters of the external world. He rather
envisages them as actors in a spectacle of what is not immedi
ately or obviously adapted to human needs or ends. A bull is
sublime not primarily because of its natural "strength," but
because it is "seldom (at least amongst us) of any use in our
business" (E, 65). In a well-known description of a horse in the
book of Job, "the useful character of the horse entirely
disappears, and the terrible and sublime blaze out together" (E,
66). Burke is careful to insist that the description does not
constitute a denial of the horse's practical value: he speaks only
of the representation of a horse. But in the representation
under consideration, the sublime appears as a culturally
mediated image of power in animals whose actual, natural
power has almost, if not entirely, already been subordinated to
human purposes.
It is in this very traditional hierarchy that Burke locates the
binary and all-encompassing opposition between ruler and
ruled. By contrast, there appears to be "no such duality," as
Foucault would put it, "extending from the top down and
reacting on more and more limited groups to the very depths
of the social body" (HSl, 94). One must rather assume that
differences in ability and ambition, as well as the inherited
advantages of gender, class, and rank, are the basis for the
cleavages and inequities that run through society as a whole.
We should note that in the Reflections Burke ridicules the view,
which he attributes to the Revolutionaries, that "a king is but
a man and a queen is but a woman" (R, 67). But it is precisely
Burke's point that the veneration customarily accorded to
monarchs can only be attributed to "the old feudal and
chivalrous spirit," not to any inherent opposition between
rulers and subjects. There is thus no room in Burke's analysis
for any notion of power as an inherent property of the
monarchy, or of its rights, laws, or institutions. Indeed, Burke
contends that we have no choice but to resort to a pleasing
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fiction of reality, for "power of some kind or other, will survive
the shock in which manners and opinions perish; and it will
find other and worse means for its support" (R, 68). Thus
power figures as a kind of intrinsic mechanism, a complex web
of strategies independent of any particular forms of domination.
All manifestations of the homage once paid to kings, on the
other hand, are only "pleasing illusions which made power
gentle and obedience liberal" (R, 67).
Of course this distinction between power and sovereignty
does not figure expressly in the Enquiry, belonging as it does to
a later stage in the development of Burke's thought. But it is
nonetheless implicit in what he has to say about the various
modalities of the sublime. These—to follow Samuel Holt
Monk's convenient summary—include
obscurity, where darkness and uncertainty arouse dread
and terror (II, 3), power, where the mind is impelled to
fear because of superior force (II, 3), privations, such as
darkness, vacuity, and silence, which are great because
they are terrible (U, 6); vastness, whether in length,
height, or depth, the last being the most powerful source
of the sublime (H, 7); infinity, or any object that because
of its size seems infinite (II, 8); difficulty—that is any
object that seems to owe its existence to a vast expendi
ture of labor and effort (H, 12); and magnificence (II,
13).^'
In this inventory, power is not merely one idea among many;
it is, in the words of Peter de Bolla, "the primum mobile of the
sublime."'^ For what obscurity, to cite only one instance,
figures forth is a certain notion of political and religious
obscurantism, the set of strategies by which institutions seek to
" Samuel Holt Monk, The Sublime (1935; Ann Arbor: Univenity of Michigan
Press, 1960), 93.
The Discourse cf the Sublime, 66.

130

1650-1850

subjugate individuals: "These despotic governments, which are
founded on the passions of men, and principally on the passion
of fear, keep their chief as much as possible from the public
eye. The policy has been the same in many cases of religion"
(E, 59). Burke's point is to at^ue—like Foucault—that "power
is exercised rather than possessed" (DP, 26). It follows that the
term cannot be applied only to institutions, but indeed is an
aspect of what makes "any thing very terrible" (E, 58), and thus
can appear in a multiplicity of contexts.
Thus the sublime figures in Burke's discourse as a very broad
political category, a principle of classification whose full
meaning cannot be grasped by any single attribute but whose
definition involves an implicit appeal to values derived through
the exercise of power. In this respect. Burke seems to anticipate
Foucault's controversial contention that "power is everywhere,"
that "it comes from everywhere," and is "permanent, repeti
tious, inert, and self-reproducing" (HSl, 93). For Burke, this
amounts to the conviction that the sublime must be reconsti
tuted in bodily terms, hence his allegiance to a psychology
guided less by the data of vision than by other modalities of
sensation and feeling. In the Enquiry, the sublime sometimes
seems to lie beyond representation—in, for example, sights and
sounds that poetry can only suggest but not represent: in the
fall of waters or hammers, in darkness rather than light. In
Burke's argument, this notion is placed in the service of an
effort to capture the intangible nature of power, its pervasive
impact on our daily lives. Burke ai^ues in the Reflections that
"the nature of man is intricate; the objects of society are of the
greatest possible complexity; and, therefore, no simple dis
position or direction of power can be suitable either to man's
nature or to the quality of his affairs" (R, 54). In the Enquiry,
Burke seeks to avoid this kind of simplification by using the
categories of the sublime and the beautiful to relate the different
dispositions and directions of power to fear and desire and, in
this sense, to link them to a certain consciousness of the body,
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or of fear and pleasure as experienced from within rather than
as perceived from without.
Burke's deemphasis of vision comes strongly to the fore in
his consideration of isolated attributes like vastness, infinity, and
succession. Power, to the extent that it can be characterized as
"permanent, repetitious, inert, and self-reproducing," is simply
the overall effect that emerges from these attributes. In his
section on infinity. Burke observes that "after whirling about;
when we sit down, the objects about us still seem to whirl.
After a long succession of noises, as the fall of waters, or the
beating of forge hammers, the hammers beat and the waters
roar in the imagination long after the first sounds have ceased
to affect it" (E, 73). Power emerges here not only in the
persistence of the sensation, not only in its tempo, duration,
intensity, etc., but also by virtue of the body's inertia, its own
activity long after the event has passed. To lend emphasis to
his conviction that this activity occurs below the level of
rational thought, Burke cites "an appearance very frequent in
madmen; that they remain whole days and nights, sometimes
whole years, in the constant repetition of some remark, some
complaint, or song" (E, 74).
This recasting of the sublime in bodily terms is not limited,
of course, to the senses of touch, taste, smell, and hearing. For
Burke, vision is a function of the power we exercise over
others; the other senses are linked to the power exercised upon
us: "when we know the full extent of any danger, when we
can accustom our eyes to it, a great deal of the apprehension
vanishes" (E, 58-9). The result of this perceptual clarity is
knowledge: "It is our ignorance of things that causes all our
admiration, and chiefly excites our passions. Knowledge and
acquaintance make the most striking causes affect us but little"
(E, 61). It follows that knowledge is power, not so much in the
sense that power is the product of a specific regime of truth, a
"general politics" of truth, but as in the more basic, post-Bacon
ian sense that it is a mode of conquest, a clarification of what
is obscure and thus a source of fear. Foucault associated this
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notion of power/knowledge, as we all know, with "systems of
surveillance"—with "a gaze. An inspecting gaze...which each
individual under its weight will end by interiorising to the
point he is his own overseer" (P/K, 155). Like Foucault, Burke
sees sight as a mode of domination, but he also holds that it
requires for its sense not only the correlative notions of
knowledge and liberation (from fear), but an intrinsic link
between them, which makes knowledge a condition of
liberation. This knowledge is relative to the understanding of
individuals: "it is thus with the vulgar, and all men are as the
vulgar in what they do not understand" (E, 61). The sublimity
of such qualities as ^^tness, succession, and infinity depends
upon their resistance to this power/knowledge: "the ideas of
eternity, and infinity, are among the most affecting we have,
and yet perhaps there is nothing of which we really understand
so little, as of infinity and eternity" (E, 61).
One might expect this argument to lead Burke to an
enlightenment aesthetics of clarity and beauty. But this would
be to ignore two main points about the structure and implica
tions of his thinking in the Enquiry. One is his obvious refusal
to regard sight as the source of an absolute norm or as the locus
of "clear and distinct ideas" that would somehow transcend the
conditions of bodily experience. Burke's privileging of the
sublime over the beautiful is rather conducted in terms of what
Martin Jay, in characterizing the parameters of Foucault's
thought, has aptly termed "an anti-ocular coun
ter-enlightenment."" Within the context of this "coun
ter-enlightenment," Burke's opposition to what would later
become the basic premises of the French Revolution is clearly
foreshadowed in the Enquiry. The other is that even when
" Martin Jay, "In the Empire of the Gaze; Foucanlt and the Denigration of Vision
in Twentieth-Century Thought," in Foucault; A Critical Reader, ed. David
Couzens Hoy (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986), 196. For a broad and fascinating
expansion of the argmnent of this essay, see his Downcast Eyes; The Denigration
of Vision in Twentieth-Century French Thought (BerkelQr; University of Calibrnia
Press, 1993).
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Burke turns to sight, as he does in the section of the Enquiry
devoted to beauty, he does so in ways that often devalorize
vision and thus knowledge. Burke holds that sight and touch
are virtually coequal in their efficacy; indeed, "if it were
possible that one might discern colour by feeling (as it is said
some blind men have done) that the same colours, and the same
disposition of colouring, which are found beautiful to the sight,
would be found likewise most grateful to the touch" (E, 121).
And when confronted with a choice between persons of
amiable qualities and those of shining virtues, "it is rather the
soft green of the soul on which we rest our eyes that are
fatigued with beholding more glaring objects" (E, 111). The
perception that results from this fatigue is evidence that the
mind is marked through and through by impulses it can never
fully articulate, that our eyes are always and everywhere in
thrall to forces that escape their self-conscious grasp. Fatigue
and the desire for a cessation of fear emerge as metaphors for
the life of the body, the signifiers of an imperceptible order of
instinctual activity located for the most part below conscious
awareness. From this it follows that one can only grasp the
workings of power if one also recognizes its underside: a
weariness, a passivity that is sometimes willing to accept defeat
or domination.
It is this kind of recognition that can help to explain why
Burke avoids citing scenes that involve a Hegelian struggle
between masters and slaves. Instead,he often dwells on activities
of a mechanical or almost somnabulistic sort. Burke's Enquiry
is justly famous for the examples it employs to illustrate the
sublimity of terror, but these examples generally avoid decisive
or otherwise pregnant narrative moments in favor of scenes of
stasis, repetition, reverie. These include a number of famous
passages from Milton and scripture: the portraits of Death and
Satan, Job's vision in the night, David's contemplation of the
"wonders of wisdom and power," of "the awe and solemnity of
the divine presence" evoked in the Psalms and prophetic books.
The example of Damiens's torture and execution might appear
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to be an exception to this general point. Yet even here the
violence is governed by laws and restrictions, and thus
maintains what Frans de Bruyn aptly describes as "the external
trappings of spectacle and show as the crucial elements in the
maintenance of order and authority."^' Hence, even though the
sublime is based on terror, Burke's illustrations never invoke
the wild and destructive forces of nature or barbaric spectacles
of rapine and revenge. The implications of this rejection of
anarchic violence extend to all the attributes of the sublime,
including Burke's preference for examples of an almost inert
sort: extension, privation, silence, and so forth.
This aspect of Burke's treatise deserves emphasis since so
many readers have taken Burke's examples merely as variants of
the stock props of the literature of the natural sublime, the
conventions of gothic fiction and of the so-called graveyard
school of poetry.^° But such an assumption cannot survive a
careful scrutiny of the actual contents of these examples. What
Burke seeks to capture in the Enquiry is not the natural battle
of life and death, but the experience of the battle at a safe
distance, a culturally mediated distance that will frame the
battle, rendering it sublime, a source of delight rather than of
terror or pain. What is significant about Burke's account is that
it also suppresses the moment of actual conflict. While the
representation of the destruction of London is a prime example
of the sublime spectacle, we must not rush to it. In order to
feel the fear and the threat, we must be in some proximity to
the spectacle, but in order to avoid being overwhelmed by
terror or a sense of uneasiness, we must wait until it has already
occurred. In section IV, this argument is accompanied by an
insistence that pain and terror are virtually indistinguishable and
that both produce "convulsive agitations" and "an unnatural
tension of the nerves" (E, 132). But we would be wrong to
" Frans De Bruyn, "Theater and Countertheater in Burke's Reflections on the
Revolution in France," in Burke and the French Revolution, 35.
See Monk, The Sublime, 88-91.
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conclude from this account that Burke's avoidance of conflict
can be traced to the view that the body and its modes of
sensuous apprehension are a mere encumbrance, obstacles that
the mind must transcend if it is to achieve a serene contempla
tion of the sublime. This might appear to follow from Burke's
description of "a man in great pain," a description that invokes
all the exaggerated features of earlier treatises on the passions
(E, 131). However, it is clear that Burke is here speaking of an
extreme state, one that prevents the full and unimpeded exercise
of mental and physical powers. For it is only insofar as the
will lacks such powers—as it has fallen into a "languid, inactive
state" afflicting mind and body alike—that it becomes subject to
"melancholy, dejection, despair, and often self-murder" (E, 135).
The best remedy for these ills. Burke contends, is "exercise or
labour,^ the exercise involved in the apprehension of a spectacle
that is terrifying but not too terrifying.
If Burke's sublime is not natural in the conventional sense,
it is also not primarily aesthetic. The adverse judgment on
Burke's sublime from a Kantian standpoint is an instance of a
Whig theory of literary history. There is no reason to suppose
that Burke would have countenanced a Kantian notion of
disinterested apprehension. To remark, as Boulton has done,
that Kant "points to the central weakness in Burke's empirical
system: it depends purely on egoistic judgments, on the
individual's appraisal of personal sensory experience" (E, cxxvii)
is to accede, without question, to Kant's view of the matter.
But for Burke, the sublime is political, rooted in self-preserva
tion, in our deepest fears and needs. It is inevitable that the
sublime defined in this way would be considered "egoistic" in
the sense of being motivated, but the plausibility of this
interpretation does not make it less misleading. Burke's
foregrounding of the material, phenomenal aspects of the
sublime includes a strong illusion of fear at the moment when
the actual danger has apparently been avoided. The sublime
involves the suspension, rather than the total elimination, of
passions and interests. One of the consequences of this notion
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is that, whereas we have traditionally been accustomed to
evaluating Burke's sublime by analogy with aesthetic response,
we should now recognize the necessity of reading it on Burke's
own terms. In contrast to Kant, who emphasizes the aesthetics
of the sublime, its capacity to please by virtue of its opposition
to the interests of the passions. Burke investigates—through his
complicated multiplicity of categories—the affiliations of the
sublime: its bond with (as well as separation from) the
passions, especially the passion of fear.

